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Health Expenditure Risk and Annuitization:  
Evidence from Medigap Coverage 
 
Daniel W. Sacks 
 
How does health insurance affect annuitization? An emerging theoretical literature 
explores the impact of medical expenditure risk on annuitization, but there is little consensus on 
the quantitative importance of this channel. Using an instrumental variables strategy, this paper 
measures the impact of supplemental Medicare insurance—Medigap—on the annuity demand of 
the elderly.  
The literature on health expenditure risk and annuitization attempts to provide an 
explanation for the under-annuitization puzzle. The puzzle is that, while economic theory 
suggests strongly that elderly individuals should annuitize much of their wealth (Yaari, 1965; 
Davidoff, Brown, and Diamond, 2005), in fact people annuitize little (e.g. Brown 2007).  Health 
expenditure risk can help resolve this puzzle, since health risk decreases the demand for 
annuities by driving up the value of liquidity. If health expenditures require large amounts of 
cash-on-hand, then annuities, with their slow and steady payouts, would be unattractive. The 
quantitative importance of this channel, however, is unclear. While Turra and Mitchell (2008) 
and Peijnenburg, Nijman, and Werker (2011a) find that medical expenditure risk may decrease 
the demand for annuities, Pashchenko (2010) and  Yogo (2011) suggest that this channel is 
quantitatively unimportant, and Peijnenburg, Nijman, and Werker (2011b) argue that full 
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annuitization remains optimal even in the presence of medical expenditure risk. Theory is 
therefore ambiguous about the of health expenditure risk for (under-)annuitization.
1
 
 Much of what we know about the impact of health risk on annuitization comes from 
calibrated or estimated structural models. Solving these models requires making untested 
assumptions about the functional forms for utility and for the distribution of medical expenditure 
risk. The impact of health expenditure risk on annuitization, in particular, appears to depend on 
assumptions about access to credit and about the timing of medical expenditure shocks. 
Peijnenburg, Nijman, and Werker (2011b) conclude that if the elderly can borrow against future 
annuity income (or save out of current annuity income), then health expenditure risk does not 
reduce annuitization. This is not surprising, since with perfect access to credit, annuities are just 
as liquid as any other investment.  
In this paper, I take an alternative approach to measuring how medical expenditure risk 
affects savings: I directly estimate the impact of health insurance on annuity demand. If indeed 
medical expenditure risks loom large, then health insurance should complement annuitization. I 
focus on Medicare Supplemental Insurance, i.e. Medigap insurance, a regulated health insurance 
product that provides extra coverage beyond Medicare.  Estimating the impact of Medigap on 
savings or annuitization is made difficult by the endogeneity of health insurance. The demand for 
insurance depends on wealth, risk preferences, and riskiness, and all of these factors also affect 
savings decisions independently. To address these concern, I use an instrumental variables 
                                                          
1
 There are of course many other explanations for the under-annuitization puzzle. Finkelstein and Poterba (2004) and  
Mitchell et al. (1999) explore adverse selection and insurance loads. Friedman and Warshawksy (1990) and 
Lockwood (2012) consider the importance of bequest motives. Chai et al. (2011) consider many sources of risk and 
complex portfolio choice. Brown (2001) contends that lifecycle models have difficulty explaining all of annuity 
demand, and Brown (2007) therefore argues that psychological factors may contribute to underannuitization. Brown 
et al. (2008, 2011) present evidence for a framing explanation of the underannuitization puzzle. 
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strategy, using the zip-code level price of Medigap as an instrument for coverage, conditioning 
on extensive controls for health, wealth, and preferences in the Health and Retirement Study.  
For this empirical strategy to succeed, I require that Medigap prices, conditional on other 
controls, be uncorrelated with underlying determinants of the demand for annuities. The 
institutional features of the Medigap market suggest that this condition may be satisfied. By law, 
Medigap insurance cannot be medically underwritten for individuals purchasing it at age 65. 
Prices in a given year thus may depend only on the buyer’s location, age, and sex. While insurers 
might charge prices based on average health in an area, it is plausible to assume that, conditional 
on an individual’s own health and sex, the price of health insurance that she faces is uncorrelated 
with her underlying annuity demand. The variation in insurance prices underlying my estimates 
comes from variation in local spending habits unrelated to the individual’s demand for medical 
care. Below I present some evidence verifying this identification assumption, showing that health 
insurance prices appear uncorrelated with individual preferences or health, conditional on 
demographic variables and permanent income.  
Medigap prices, conditional on demographic and other controls, have a very strong 
impact on Medigap coverage. Across specifications, I estimate a stable and precise price 
elasticity of demand for Medigap coverage of about -1.5, with large F-statistics that allay weak 
instrument concerns. The first stage is not robust, however, to controlling for state fixed effects, 
because these controls absorb almost all the variation in the instrument. An important weakness 
of this empirical strategy, therefore, is that I cannot control for unobserved state-level factors 
affecting Medigap prices and annuity or savings demand. 
With this concern in mind, I next examine the reduced form relationship between 
annuitization, and Medigap prices. Nonparametric estimates of this relationship illustrate the 
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variation that underlies the instrumental variables regression. The result show a clear and 
negative relationship between Medigap prices and annuitization, measured as either the 
probability of having positive pension or annuity income, or as the amount of pension or annuity 
income. The instrumental variables estimates quantifying the relationship between Medigap 
coverage and annuitization suggest that health insurance has a strong impact on annuitization: 
the elasticity of non-Social Security annuity income with respect to Medigap coverage is about 
0.56. About two-thirds of the response is on the extensive margin; I estimate an extensive margin 
elasticity of about 0.39. Social Security income also responds to Medigap coverage, with an 
elasticity of about 0.11. All of these results are robust across a variety of specifications. While 
the point estimates are perhaps too large to be believed, they nonetheless indicate an important 
role for medical expenditure risk in annuity demand.  
The main contribution of this paper, therefore, is to provide direct empirical evidence on 
the relationship between annuity demand and medical expenditure risk. It also contributes to the 
large literature on precautionary savings among the elderly. Palumbo (1999) and De Nardi, 
French, and Jones (2010) showed that medical expenditure risk has a large impact on the savings 
among older Americans. Given the importance of medical expenditure risk for overall savings, it 
is not surprising that annuitization responds as well. 
1. Background on Medigap Insurance 
Elderly Americans in the United States face several sources of medical expenditure risk. 
Medicare does not cover long term care, and this shortcoming represents a serious financial risk 
to the elderly (cf. Brown and Finkelstein, 2007). Moreover, the health insurance provided by 
Medicare is incomplete because of its cost-sharing provisions. Medicare Part A, which covers 
hospitalizations, requires patients to pay for the first day of hospitalization, and Part B, which 
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covers outpatient services, has a 20 percent coinsurance rate. Medicare did not cover prescription 
drugs until the introduction of Part D in 2006, and the standard benefit in Part D today includes 
substantial cost sharing with a deductible and a “donut hole” with 100 percent coinsurance rate 
for expenditures above a certain amount. 
 Seniors may buy supplemental insurance to fill in the holes in Medicare’s coverage. 
These policies are called Medigap plans and they are tightly regulated by the federal 
government. Insurers may offer policies from a menu of 12 standardized plans (denoted by 
letters A through N). All plans cover Part A coinsurance and at least part of the Part B 
coinsurance, but they differ in their coverage otherwise.
2
 A key feature of the Medigap market is 
that if individuals purchase policies at the time they claim Medicare coverage, then insurers 
cannot use medical underwriting. Plans instead are priced on sex and location.
3
 Many plans are 
also priced based on the buyer’s age of purchase, so that individuals have a strong incentive to 
purchase a policy at age 65, and the price they face at age 65 is the price they will face for the 
rest of their life (if they choose to renew their policies). These plans are called “age-issued.”  
Plans can also be “attained-age,” in which case prices vary with age, or “community rated,” in 
which case prices do not vary with age, but vary from year to year according to a local risk 
rating. I focus on attained-age prices, because these prices at age 65 are likely to have a strong 
and lasting influence on Medigap coverage throughout retirement.  
Insurers setting these prices are prohibited from underwriting based on individual health 
or mortality expectations. The association between local prices at age 65 and long-term Medigap 
coverage, and the fact that prices cannot depend on individual-specific health/wealth/mortality, 
motivates my instrumental variables identification strategy. Prices in these markets depend 
                                                          
2
 For a detailed description of Medigap plans and eligibility/pricing rules, see CMS-NAIC (2012), 
http://www.medicare.gov/publications/pubs/pdf/02110.pdf. 
3
 Plans may also charge different prices to smokers and non-smokers, but this is very rare in practice. 
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instead on the underlying area-level demand for Medical care (which I assume derive from from 
risk preferences, health, and wealth). Even conditional on an individual’s demand for medical 
care, there is substantial variation in prices, since insurance companies cannot perfectly risk 
adjust (or price discriminate). This variation is plausibly orthogonal to individual savings 
propensities, so it may be useful as an instrument. 
2. Data: Weiss Ratings and the Health and Retirement Study 
The data for this study come from two sources: the Health and Retirement Study 
conducted by the University of Michigan, and a proprietary insurance pricing database created 
by Weiss Ratings, Inc. The HRS provides information on demographics, preferences, wealth, 
annuitization, and insurance coverage. I merge the HRS data at the zip code level to the 
insurance pricing information.  
2.1 Weiss Ratings Data 
Weiss Ratings is a market research firm that collects Medigap pricing information from 
firms in most states. Their dataset contains pricing information at the level of year-zip code-firm-
plan letter, for 1998-2004.  For every zip code it is possible to see every plan offered and the 
prices charged by each company. There is a fair amount of price dispersion within zip code, as 
Maestas, Schroeder and Goldman (2007) show, but very little dispersion in mean price across zip 
codes within a state (given plan characteristics). Although in principle, prices can differ by sex, 
in practice mean prices for men and women are extremely highly correlated within zip code 
(       . Prices are also very highly autocorrelated over time.  
 I take the price of Medigap insurance as the mean within-zip code price of an attained-
age Plan A policy, allowing prices to differ by sex. There is little lost by using mean Plan A price 
rather than different plans, or some combination of plan prices, since the prices are highly 
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correlated. For example, the correlation between Plan A and Plan F prices is 0.95. Since the age 
65 price determines the path of future prices, I use the mean price in an individual’s zip code 
when she turns 65.  
From the analysis, I exclude Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Wisconsin because these 
states have their own set of Medigap plans, so the prices and policies are not comparable to those 
in other states.  I exclude Connecticut, Maine, New Jersey, and New York because they lack age-
issued policies in the Weiss data. I also lack data on Arizona and Vermont for 2002-2004, and on 
Washington for 1999 and 2002-2004, but when I do have data for those states, I include them in 
the analysis.  
2.2 Health and Retirement Study 
The Health and Retirement Study is a longitudinal survey following older Americans. It 
began in 1992, collecting detailed information about work, health, and wealth for a 
representative sample of the cohort born between 1931 and 1941; this is the original “HRS” 
cohort. In subsequent years, the study added additional cohorts born later and earlier; my 
analysis here focuses only on heads of household from the original HRS cohort. The HRS offers 
a wider range of variables than other longitudinal datasets like the PSID or NLS, and these extra 
variables are essential to the present study. The HRS asks about pension and annuity income, and 
Social Security income. Pension and annuity income consists of all income from private 
annuities or employer-provided pensions, including both defined-benefit and defined-
contribution pensions. These variables are the main outcomes of interest. I also make use of the 
HRS’s extensive health and preference information as additional controls.  
The analysis sample is restricted to heads of household age 65 or older with Medicare 
coverage not covered by employer-provided health insurance. This sample definition follows 
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Fang, Keane, and Silverman (2008), who study Medigap demand extensively; like them, I 
exclude 2,352 observations of 553 people with employer-provided health insurance because I 
expect Medigap coverage to be superfluous for these people. I also exclude individuals with 
imputed values for pension/annuity income or for any assets, and people with missing values for 
any of the outcomes or controls.
4
 The final sample has 3,335 observations of 1,406 people.  
Table 1 shows summary statistics on the key variables for the full sample and for the 
analysis sample. All dollar amounts are in 2010-constant dollars. I present summary statistics 
separately by whether the respondent has Medigap coverage, defined as having supplemental 
insurance and receiving Medicare (again following Fang, Keane, and Silverman, 2008). About 
one-third of the sample have purchased Medigap policies. Relative to the uncovered, people with 
Medigap coverage generally face lower Medigap prices, as expected. The covered group is also 
to be female, have fewer children, to be white, and have much higher permanent income, defined 
as average income over the pre-retirement period. (De Nardi, French, and Jones (2010) and 
Carroll and Samwick (1997) use a similar permanent income concept.) People with supplemental 
insurance coverage are healthier than those without: they are more likely to report being in good 
health, and they suffer less from many chronic diseases. Fang, Keane, and Silverman (2008) 
explore this advantageous selection in detail. People with Medigap are more likely to have 
annuity income, have more annuity income, and have higher savings than people without. 
3. Empirical strategy and first stage results 
3.1 Empirical Strategy 
In what follows, I use local price variation in Medigap policies as an instrument for 
Medigap coverage, conditioning on the individual-level characteristics that might affect savings 
                                                          
4
 In results not reported, I experimented with including individuals with imputed values. In all cases, I found slightly 
stronger impacts of Medigap on annuitization. 
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decisions and correlate with local prices.  To see why this strategy is necessary, and why it might 
be successful, let     be the outcome of interest (savings or annuitization) for individual   at age 
   and let           indicate Medigap coverage at     I assume these variables are related as 
follows: 
      (                      (1) 
                               (2) 
The object of interest is  , the impact of         on annuitization. Annuitization decisions, 
however, depend not only on health insurance coverage but also on wealth, preferences (i.e. risk 
aversion and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution), and health and mortality expectations. 
But since individuals choose whether to purchase insurance,           depends on these 
variables as well, creating an endogeneity problem. 
 Using local Medigap prices as an instrumental variable potentially overcomes this 
problem, since identification comes from variation in insurance prices that is plausibly 
orthogonal to individual wealth, preferences, or health. That is, insurance prices are a function of 
aggregate (zip-code) level variables only. These variables likely include aggregate (determinants 
of) demand for medical care (and also medical care costs, administrative costs, and market 
structure in the Medigap industry). Because similar individuals—individuals with the same 
underlying demand for savings products—can live in zip codes with very different demands for 
medical care, there is a great deal of variation in the price of Medigap coverage, even conditional 
on savings propensities. Local prices can therefore isolate variation in Medigap coverage, 
independent of savings attitudes. 
One concern in using cross zip-code variation in Medigap prices, however, is that these 
prices may be systematically correlated with zip-code level characteristics that directly affect 
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savings behavior.
5
 For example, it may be that areas in which people have unusually high 
medical expenses have both high Medigap prices and high savings. In principle, people might 
decide to live in a given zip code because it has low Medigap prices. Here the control variables 
are useful: the threat to identification comes from the correlation between prices and individual 
health, wealth, and preferences. But using the rich HRS data, I can condition on these variables. 
To the extent that the results are robust to these controls, it is unlikely that additional unobserved 
determinants of savings or annuity demand are also correlated with local prices. The instrumental 
variables estimator therefore relies on variation in prices across people with similar 
characteristics to identify the impact of insurance on savings or annuitization.  
In what follows, I show that, conditional on demographics and permanent income, 
Medigap prices are uncorrelated with health and preferences. These results provide some 
reassurance of the validity of the instrument, since these prices appear uncorrelated with many 
individual-level determinants of savings and annuity demand. One remaining concern, though, is 
that high Medigap prices could reflect high administrative costs for insurance companies in that 
region, and therefore high prices might also signal high annuity prices (i.e. low returns); if so, 
this could bias estimates towards finding a positive impact of Medigap coverage on 
annuitization.  
Two considerations cast doubt on this possibility. First, in their analysis of annuity 
premiums from a single large UK insurer in the 1980s and 1990s, Finkelstein and Poterba (2004) 
report that firms set  geographically uniform prices, despite important variation in mortality 
across regions. This fact suggests that annuity premiums are not likely to be systematically 
higher in areas with high Medigap prices. It is not clear, however, whether the experience of that 
                                                          
5
 Local prices can affect annuity or savings demand through income effects as well as substitution effects, but for 
my purposes this distinction is irrelevant: all that matters is that the prices alone (and not some omitted variable) is 
affecting annuity or savings. 
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firm generalizes to the United States in the 1990s and 2000s.
6
Sstate-level data on annuity prices 
would let me address this concern directly, but I am unaware of any such data. As a second piece 
of evidence, I use premium data for several annuity providers collected in 1995 by A.M. Best 
(examined by Mitchell et al., 1999).  I match this pricing information to the provider’s state (as 
listed by A.M. Best in their ratings) and correlate annuity premiums with state average Medigap 
premiums (in 1998, the earliest year for which I have data). This exercise reveals that the 
correlation between the price of a $10/month annuity and state Medigap price is virtually nil (-
0.04). This procedure is of course far from perfect, but it suggests there is very little geographic 
correlation between Medigap prices and annuity premiums. 
3.2 First Stage Results 
 Table 2 presents the first stage estimates of equation (2). Each column presents the 
estimate   obtained from using a different set of controls, as well as the F-statistic on        , 
which provides a test of instrument strength. Column (1) reports estimates of   obtained with a 
basic set of controls: year fixed effects, a quartic in age, and indicators for race, sex, marital 
status, educational attainment (high school, some college, and college or more), and dummy 
variables for having one, two, or three or more children. These controls serve two functions. 
First, the year and age controls and the sex dummy are directly correlated with Medigap prices, 
since prices are set yearly and have increased over time. To the extent that there are differences 
in annuity demand by age, year, or sex, it is therefore important to control for these variables. 
Second, the demographic variables are closely related to lifetime earnings potential and savings 
demand, and this may have a large impact on both savings and demand for medical care (through 
                                                          
6
 Finkelstein and Poterba (2004, pp. 190-1) write, “…like other firms in the market, [the firm we study] varies the 
annuity price on the basis of only age and gender, and not on the basis of the individual’s geographic location,” 
suggesting that this pricing practice is common at least in the UK. 
13 
 
 
income effects). Controlling for these variables helps control for the correlation between local 
demand for medical care (which influences Medigap prices) and own demand for annuities. 
The coefficient on         (   is -0.48 and, with a standard error of 0.06; it is precisely 
estimated and highly statistically significant. Here and throughout, all standard errors are 
clustered at the individual level since I pool multiple years of data for each individual. The F-
statistic on log-price is 59.4, alleviating concern about a possible weak instrument. The sample 
mean of          is 0.33, implying an average elasticity of about -1.5, somewhat larger than 
Starc’s (2012) estimate of an own price  elasticity of demand for Medigap plans of about -1.1.  
 Figure 1 provides the graphical analog of the first stage relationship. The figure shows 
the non-parametric relationship between Medigap coverage and Medigap price, both net of 
controls. To construct the figure, I regress Medigap coverage and          on the age, year, and 
demographic controls (separately), form the residuals, and then estimate a local linear regression 
of residual Medigap coverage on residual        ; this is exactly the variation underlying the 
first stage regression. As the Figure shows, there is a clear negative relationship between 
Medigap coverage and its price. This relationship seems to level off for a range of prices before 
declining.  
 While the basic controls adjust for standard demographic differences across people, they 
may still control inadequately for aspects of insurance demand that are also correlated with local 
prices. Column (2) adds controls for permanent income: a cubic in the log of permanent income, 
plus log permanent income interacted with age. One concern with the identification strategy is 
that, because health care and savings are normal goods, high-income areas will have high savings 
and high Medigap prices. Controlling for permanent income addresses this concern, and since 
the estimate of   hardly changes, there is little evidence that own permanent income is closely 
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related to Medigap demand or prices. Permanent income is perhaps an indirect measure of 
lifetime wealth, but controlling for wealth directly would be inappropriate since wealth is an 
outcome of interest. Nonetheless, in results not reported here, I control for wealth at age 65 
rather than permanent income; the estimates are very similar. In the robustness section below, I 
also control for pre-retirement wealth, and again the results are confirmed. 
 The next two columns control for health and then preferences more directly. Column (3) 
adds indicators for health status (excellent, very good, good, fair, or poor), as well as indicators 
for ever having one of several chronic diseases or medical conditions (high blood pressure, 
diabetes, cancer, lung disease, heart disease, stroke, or arthritis). Column (4) controls explicitly 
for the HRS’s measures of risk preferences and mortality expectancy. The risk preference 
measures are the average value of risk tolerance implied by a person’s answer, over several 
rounds, to questions about large hypothetical gambles (Barksy et al., 1997.) Controlling for risk 
preferences can be important if area-level variation in risk preferences induces low Medigap 
prices while simultaneously inducing high annuitization. Fang, Keane, and Silverman (2008) 
demonstrate that advantageous selection is an important feature of the Medigap market. As 
columns (3) and (4) show, the first stage results are virtually unchanged by introducing these 
controls. 
 The first stage results are therefore highly robust to controlling for individual-level 
factors that might be correlated with insurance prices while directly affecting savings. The main 
results are similarly robust, as I show below. However, to the extent that permanent area-level 
differences in preferences or health may be driving  differences in prices across areas, the most 
direct control is simply to include state (or zip code) fixed effects. As Maestas, Schroeder and 
Goldman (2007) show, however, most of the geographic variation in Medigap prices is between 
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(rather than within) states; controlling for state fixed effects eliminates almost all the variation in 
prices. Controlling for state fixed effects shows this clearly: the coefficient on log price falls and 
its standard error increases. These state fixed effects eliminate the first stage relationship because 
there is no variation remaining to (precisely) identify  . Indeed, if I regress the instrument on the 
other controls, I obtain an    of 0.91, but when I include state fixed effects, the   rises to 0.97, 
implying that the state fixed effects absorb about two-thirds the remaining variation in the 
instrument. Since the first stage F-statistics are so low, state fixed effects cannot be used.   
3.3 Assessing instrument validity 
The first stage results are essentially unchanged when additional controls are included for 
permanent income, health status, and preferences. This robustness provides a first hint that the 
instrument may be valid: since these controls do not affect the first stage estimate of  , either 
they are uncorrelated with Medigap coverage, or they are uncorrelated with        . To the 
extent that observable determinants of savings and annuitization are uncorrelated with the 
instrument, it is likely that the unobservables are also uncorrelated.   
 Table 3 presents direct evidence that the instrument is uncorrelated with these additional 
controls. Each column of the table reports estimates from a regression of         on the 
indicated controls; F-statistics test that the indicated set of controls is jointly equal to zero. 
Column (1) again has only the basic controls; here we see, as expected, that the year and age 
controls are highly correlated with Medigap prices. The race indicators and education year fixed 
effects are also significantly correlated. Sex is, somewhat surprisingly, uncorrelated with price, 
while the children dummies are at most weakly correlated. Column (2) adds controls for 
permanent income, which is correlated with the instrument. In regressions below, controlling for 
permanent income does not affect results because permanent income turns out not to be closely 
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correlated with annuitization, conditional on the demographic variables. Column (3) adds 
controls for self-reported health status and for chronic diseases. Health appears uncorrelated with 
prices. Finally, Column (4) controls for self-assessed mortality and risk tolerance. These 
preference variables are also uncorrelated with the instrument.  
In sum, the instrument is largely uncorrelated with health, or preferences, conditional on 
basic demographics and permanent income, although there is some correlation between local 
prices and indicators for having chronic disease. These results may ease concern that the 
instrument might be systematically correlated with unobserved determinants of savings or 
annuitization. 
4. Medigap coverage increases annuitization 
I now turn to estimating the impact of Medigap coverage on annuitization. I begin with 
income from private (i.e. non-Social Security) pension and annuity income, looking first at the  
probability of having any pension or annuity income, and then the amount of yearly  pension and 
annuity income. When I look at the amount of pension income, I work in levels despite the 
skewness of the data because many people have zero income.  The results in logs are highly 
imprecise. I exclude Social Security income because over 90% of the sample has positive Social 
Security income, making it difficult to detect any effect on the extensive margin. Nonetheless, 
people can increase their Social Security income by claiming later (as well as other 
mechanisms), so I examine the impact of Medigap coverage on Social Security income receipt.  
 Table 4 shows the impact of Medigap coverage on the probability of having positive 
pension or annuity income, estimated with a linear probability model.
9
 Panel A provides the 
reduced form result, where the coefficient on          is obtained by regressing an indicator for 
                                                          
9
 The marginal effects of         implied by probit estimates (not reported) are very similar to the reduced-form 
coefficients, however. 
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positive pension or annuity income on          and the indicated controls. The coefficient on 
         is a statistically significant -0.20, indicating that increasing the price of Medigap 
coverage by 10 percent would reduce the annuitization rate by about two percentage points. 
Figure 2, constructed analogously to Figure 1, illustrates the reduced form relationship between 
annuitization coverage and prices: it shows the nonparametric fit between (the residual) 
annuitization probability and (residual) prices (net of controls). There is a clear negative 
relationship, although it is not as precise as the first stage relationship.  
 Panel B of Table 4 presents the instrumental variables estimate of  , the impact of 
Medigap coverage on annuitization, estimated via two stage least squares with          as the 
excluded instrument. The coefficient is 0.41. To interpret this number, it is helpful to calculate 
the elasticity of (aggregate) annuitization it implies. With mean Medigap coverage of 0.33 and 
mean annuitization probability of 0.35, the elasticity of annuitization with respect to Medigap 
coverage is about 0.39. A policy change that increases Medigap coverage by 10 percent would 
increase the probability of having private pension or annuity income by about 4 percent. 
 Columns (2), (3), and (4) include successively more controls, and results change very 
little. The point estimates fall by two percentage points when controlling for permanent income, 
and a further two when controlling for the health variables. Controlling for preferences has no 
further impact on the estimate. This suggest that Medigap coverage appears to have a large and 
robust positive impact on annuitization. 
 These results, of course, reflect only the extensive margin, that is, whether people have 
any private annuity income at all. Equally important is the intensive margin—the amount of 
income derived from private annuities and pensions. Table 5 shows the impact of Medigap 
coverage on average annuity income. Increases in annuity income reflect both intensive and 
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extensive margin responses and therefore summarize the overall impact of Medigap on the 
demand for annuity income. Figure 3 illustrates this relationship graphically, showing the 
relationship (net of age, year, and demographic controls) between private pension or annuity 
income and        . 
 The reduced form results in Panel A indicate a strong inverse relationship between 
Medigap prices and annuity income. Increasing Medigap prices by 10 percent reduces annuity 
income by about $550, relative to an annual mean of about $6,300. This number is fairly 
consistent across specifications, although including health or preference controls reduces it 
slightly. The instrumental variables results in Panel B yield a point estimate of $9,500-11,600, 
with a fairly wide confidence interval. Since mean annuity income is about $6,200, these point 
estimates imply an overall elasticity of annuity income with respect to Medigap coverage of 
about 0.56. Comparing this to the extensive margin elasticity implies that about perhaps seventy 
percent of the impact of Medigap coverage on annuitization comes from the extensive margin, 
and the remainder from the extensive margin. 
 Figure 4 turns to the impact of Medigap coverage on Social Security income, plotting the 
reduced form relationship between Social Security income and Medigap prices. The figure 
shows a negative relationship between Medigap prices and Social Security income, especially at 
high prices. Table 6 quantifies this relationship. The reduced form results in Panel A of table 6 
indicate an average slope of -1,900, with additional controls attenuating this relationship 
somewhat. The instrumental variables results in Panel B indicate that Medigap coverage 
increases Social Security income by $3,600-$4,000.The implied elasticity of Social Security 
income is about 0.11. 
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 Social Security benefits are a function of lifetime earnings, claiming age, and work 
experience post-claiming.
10
 Since I condition on permanent income, Medigap coverage can 
affect Social Security income primarily by encouraging people to claim benefits at older ages. In 
results not detailed here, I examine the impact of Medigap coverage on the age of claiming, 
defined as the age in which a person first reports positive Social Security results. The results are 
imprecise but indicate that Medigap coverage raises the claiming age by about two-thirds of a 
year, relative to a mean of 64.3. During the sample period, delaying claiming raises future 
benefits by about 7 percent, so either the impact of Medigap on Social Security claiming is 
concentrated among high-income earners, or Medigap affects claiming through channels other 
than claiming age. In particular, the Earnings Test can affect benefits in complex ways, reducing 
them in years with high earnings, but increasing them after the Normal Retirement Age. 
5. Robustness: Controlling for pre-determined endogenous variables 
I have shown that the impact of Medigap coverage on annuity demand is robust to 
extensive controls for income, health, and preferences. Nonetheless, it is possible that the 
instrument remains correlated with unobserved determinants of savings or annuity demand. In 
this section, I explore the robustness of my main results to additional controls. 
One threat to identification comes from a possible correlation between own medical 
expenditures and area medical expenditures. If own medical expenditures and annuity or savings 
demand are also negatively correlated, then the instrumental variables results will be biased 
upward. Such a correlation could arise if people with low discount factors, present-biased 
preferences, or high mortality expectations underinvest in health when young; when old, they 
would have high health expenditures and little demand for savings. If people sorted across areas 
                                                          
10
 Friedberg (1998) provides detailed explanation of the relationship between claiming age and benefits. Because of 
the Social Security Earnings Test, an individual with sufficiently high earnings after claiming benefits loses her 
benefits in the year with high earnings, but this is offset by higher benefits after she reaches Normal Retirement Age.  
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on the basis of demand for medical care, then there would be a positive correlation between own 
health expenditures and aggregate expenditures, and hence also Medigap prices. 
A natural way to address this issue is to simply control directly for individual-level 
medical expenditures. A problem with this approach is that medical expenditures depend on 
insurance coverage, so controlling for medical expenditures may absorb part of the effect of 
Medigap coverage. As a partial solution, I control for mean out-of-pocket expenditures prior to 
age 65, since these expenditures are likely unaffected by Medigap prices. It is possible that in 
areas with high prices, people use employer-provided health insurance more intensively 
immediately before retiring. This seems unlikely, however, since Card, Dobkin and Maestas 
(2009) show that medical care utilization increases discontinuously at age 65, when people 
become eligible for Medicare, suggesting that people typically delay treatment until after 
retiring. If pre-retirement demand for healthcare when young (conditional on observables) 
reflects the unobservable determinants of demand for healthcare while old, then these health 
expenditures proxy for unobservables. 
A second way to address this problem is to control for pre-retirement savings, again using 
pre-determined endogenous variables as a proxy for the unobserved determinants of savings and 
annuity demand. Here assets are defined as total net assets including savings, real estate, and 
businesses, but not the asset value of pensions or annuity holdings. This approach suffers from 
the same problem as using pre-retirement health expenditures: people may save before retirement 
in anticipation of wanting more precautionary wealth after retirement.  Because of these 
endogeneity problems, I view these additional control variables as robustness checks rather than 
preferred specifications.  
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Table 7 shows the results of controlling for these pre-retirement endogenous variables in 
addition to the basic set of controls. Column (1) presents results for the probability of having 
private pension or annuity income; Column (2) shows results for the level of pension/annuity 
income, and Column (3) reports results for Social Security income. For comparison, I also report 
baseline results. The point estimates are essentially unchanged for private annuities when 
controlling for medical expenditures; if anything, this strengthens the estimated impact of 
Medigap coverage on annuity income. Controlling for assets has a similarly small impact on the 
point estimates, and controlling for both assets and expenditures simultaneously also does not 
affect estimates. The point estimates for Social Security income do respond to the additional 
controls, falling (in absolute value) with controls for medical spending but rising with controls 
for pre-retirement wealth, with little net impact. Even taking the smallest point estimates (in 
absolute value), there still remains an important role for Medigap coverage in affecting annuity 
decisions. Overall, then, my findings are robust to the inclusion of these pre-retirement variables, 
and to the extent that these variables proxy for unobserved determinants of savings or 
annuitization demand, they suggest that correlation between the instrument and unobservables do 
not drive the results. 
6. Conclusions 
This paper examined the impact of Medigap coverage on annuitization and savings 
decisions, using local prices of Medigap coverage as an instrument for coverage. I found that that 
Medigap coverage has a  large impact on annuitization, with an aggregate elasticity of private 
annuity income with respect to Medigap coverage of about 0.56. About 70 percent of this effect 
operates through the extensive margin. Medigap coverage also appears to induce higher Social 
Security income, with an elasticity of about 0.11.   
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  While the results are robust to extensive individual-level controls for income, health, and 
preferences, I cannot control for state-level factors affecting insurance prices and savings 
demand. One such factor is that medical expenditure risk may vary at the state level because of 
differences in physician behavior (e.g. Gottlieb et al. 2010). To the extent that this risk variation 
drives annuitization or savings decisions, then our results here may be biased upward -- although 
they would still support the view that medical expenditure risk has a large impact on 
annuitization decisions. An alternative threat to identification is that state-level differences in 
wealth or prudence might boost the demand for medical care, driving up Medigap prices, and 
hence have a direct effect on annuity demand. The variables used here can only imperfectly 
control for these differences in lifetime wealth and preferences, and so this concern remains. 
Nonetheless, my results suggest that medical expenditure risk may be an important part of the 
underannuitization puzzle, as people hold their wealth in a liquid form in order to finance 
unexpected health care needs. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 All Medigap No Medigap 
Has Medigap (%) 0.33 
(0.47) 
-- -- 
Price of Medigap    
(dollars/year) 
1030 
(275) 
980 
(259) 
1055 
(278) 
Female (%) 0.51 
(0.50) 
0.57 
(0.50) 
0.48 
(0.50) 
Age (%) 69.2 
(2.7) 
69.4 
(2.6) 
69.0 
(2.8) 
Black (%) 0.10 
(0.31) 
0.03 
(0.17) 
0.15 
(0.35) 
Married (%) 0.50 
(0.50) 
0.54 
(0.50) 
0.48 
(0.50) 
Number of children 3.32 
(2.11) 
3.06 
(1.96) 
3.45 
(2.17) 
Excellent/very good 
health (%) 
0.36 
(0.48) 
0.42 
(0.49) 
0.33 
(0.47) 
Ever high blood 
pressure (%) 
0.60 
(0.49) 
0.61 
(0.49) 
0.60 
(0.49) 
Ever diabetes (%) 0.24 
(0.43) 
0.20 
(0.40) 
0.25 
(0.44) 
Ever cancer (%) 0.16 
(0.37) 
0.16 
(0.36) 
0.17 
(0.37) 
Ever lung disease (%) 0.14 
(0.35) 
0.11 
(0.31) 
0.16 
(0.37) 
Ever heart disease (%) 0.27 
(0.44) 
0.28 
(0.45) 
0.27 
(0.44) 
Ever stroke (%) 0.08 
(0.27) 
0.07 
(0.25) 
0.09 
(0.28) 
Ever arthritis (%) 0.68 
(0.47) 
0.67 
(0.47) 
0.68 
(0.47) 
Permanent income 
(thousands $/year) 
73.0 
(93.6) 
87.1 
(95.9) 
66.1 
(91.8) 
Has pension or annuity 
income (%) 
0.35 
(0.48) 
0.39 
(0.49) 
0.33 
(0.47) 
Private pension/annuity 
inc (thousands $/year) 
6.34 
(26.6) 
6.76 
(24.67) 
6.14 
(27.6) 
Has Social Security 
Income (%) 
0.95 
(0.22) 
0.98 
(0.13) 
0.93 
(0.25) 
Social Security Income 
(thousands $/year) 
11.3 
(5.40) 
12.5 
(5.06) 
10.7 
(5.46) 
N People 1406 348 1058 
N Observations 3335 994 2341 
Notes: Table shows mean and, in parentheses, the standard deviation of selected variables, for the analysis sample 
and by Medigap coverage status.  
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Table 2: First Stage Results 
Dependent Var.: 
Has Medigap  
(1) 
Basic 
(2)  
Permanent income  
(3) 
Health  
(4) 
Preferences 
(5) 
State FEs 
Coefficient on 
log(Medigap 
price) 
-0.48*** 
(0.06) 
-0.47*** 
(0.06) 
-0.47*** 
(0.06) 
-0.47*** 
(0.06) 
-0.09 
(0.09) 
   0.16 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.26 
F-Statistic 67.7 65.3 68.4 66.7 1.0 
      
Controls for:      
Age quartic Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Permanent inc.  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Health   Yes Yes Yes 
Preferences    Yes Yes 
State FEs     Yes 
Note: Table shows the results of regressing Medigap coverage on the log of price, plus the indicated controls. The 
price is the zipcode-average price of plan A coverage in effect the year of turning 65.  See the text for a definition of 
the sample. The sample consists of 3,335 observations of 1,406 individuals. Demographic controls are a quartic in 
age, plus dummies for female, black, married, educational attainment (high school, some college, college or more), 
married, and number of children (one, two, or three plus). The permanent income control is a cubic in the log of 
permanent income (average income before retirement), plus an interaction between log permanent income and age. 
The health controls add a set of dummy variables for several chronic conditions, plus indicators for self-reported 
health status. The preference controls are controls for subjective mortality expectations and subjective risk tolerance. 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered on individuals, are in parentheses. Asterisks indicate statistical 
significance, with *: p<0.1, ** p<0.05, and *** p<0.01.  
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Table 3: Tests of instrument validity 
F-statistic for test of 
joint significance: 
(1) 
Basic 
(2)  
Permanent income  
(3) 
Health  
(4) 
Preferences 
Year Fixed Effects 454 
(0.00) 
452 
(0.00) 
426 
(0.00) 
424 
(0.00) 
Age trend 639 
(0.00) 
164 
(0.00) 
164 
(0.00) 
166 
(0.00) 
Children dummies 1.05 
(0.37) 
1.07 
(0.36) 
0.90 
(0.44) 
0.95 
(0.41) 
Female Indicator 5.11 
(0.02) 
5.74 
(0.02) 
4.08 
(0.04) 
5.10 
(0.02) 
Black 4.47 
(0.02) 
3.34 
(0.07) 
3.57 
(0.06) 
2.20 
(0.14) 
Educational 
attainment 
2.14 
(0.09) 
1.88 
(0.13) 
1.73 
(0.16) 
1.51 
(0.21) 
Permanent income  4.88 
(0.00) 
4.70 
(0.00) 
4.85 
(0.00) 
Health Status 
indicators 
  0.67 
(0.61) 
0.70 
(0.59) 
Chronic disease 
indicators 
  1.29 
(0.22) 
1.33 
(0.20) 
Self-assessed 
mortality 
   1.82 
(0.16) 
Risk Tolerance    0.17 
(0.68) 
     
Controls for:     
Age quartic Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Permanent income  Yes Yes Yes 
Health   Yes Yes 
Preferences    Yes 
Note: The table is constructed by regressing log Medigap price on the indicated controls. Demographic controls are 
dummies for female, black, married, educational attainment (high school, some college, college or more), and 
number of children (one, two, or three plus). The permanent income control is a cubic in the log of permanent 
income (average income before retirement), plus an interaction between log permanent income and age. The health 
controls add a set of dummy variables for several chronic conditions, plus indicators for self-reported health status. 
The preference terms control for subjective mortality expectations and subjective risk tolerance. The price is the 
zipcode-average price of Medigap plan A coverage in effect the year of turning 65.  The table reports F-statistics of 
the test that the coefficients on the indicated controls are jointly equal to zero, with p-values in parentheses. See the 
text for a definition of the sample. The sample consists of 3,335 observations of 1,406 individuals. 
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Table 4: Impact of Medigap on probability of having private pension or annuity income 
Dependent Var.: 
Has private pension 
or annuity income  
(1) 
Basic 
(2)  
Permanent income  
(3) 
Health  
(4) 
Preferences 
Panel A: Reduced Form 
Coefficient on 
log(Medigap 
price) 
-0.20*** 
(0.07) 
-0.18** 
(0.07) 
-0.17** 
(0.07) 
-0.17** 
(0.07) 
Panel B: IV Results 
Coefficient on 
Medigap 
0.41** 
(0.17) 
0.39** 
(0.17) 
0.37** 
(0.16) 
0.37** 
(0.16) 
     
Controls for:     
Age quartic Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Permanent inc.  Yes Yes Yes 
Health   Yes Yes 
Preferences    Yes 
Note: Table shows the linear-probability model instrumental variables estimate of the impact of Medigap coverage 
on the probability of having positive income from pension or annuities. The mean of the dependent variable is 0.35, 
and its standard deviation is 0.48. The excluded instrument is the log of Medigap price; its coefficient is reported in 
Panel B, and the reduced form coefficient on log price is reported in panel A. Additional controls are included as 
indicated. See the text for a definition of the sample. The sample consists of 3,335 observations of 1,406 individuals. 
Demographic controls are dummies for female, black, married, educational attainment (high school, some college, 
college or more), and number of children (one, two, or three plus). The permanent income control is a cubic in the 
log of permanent income (average income before retirement), plus an interaction between log permanent income and 
age. The health controls add a set of dummy variables for several chronic conditions, plus indicators for self-
reported health status. The preference controls are controls for subjective mortality expectations and subjective risk 
tolerance. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered on individuals, are in parentheses. Asterisks indicate 
statistical significance, with *: p<0.1, ** p<0.05, and *** p<0.01. 
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Table 5: Impact of Medigap on pension / annuity income 
Dependent Var.:  
private pension or 
annuity income 
 ($ thousands) 
(1) 
Basic 
(2)  
Permanent income  
(3) 
Health  
(4) 
Preferences 
Panel A: Reduced Form 
Coefficient on 
log(Medigap 
price) 
-5.57** 
(2.74) 
-5.22** 
(2.63) 
-4.45* 
(2.38) 
-4.68* 
(2.39) 
Panel B: IV Results 
Coefficient on 
Medigap 
11.6** 
(5.85) 
11.2* 
(5.83) 
9.48* 
(5.19) 
10.35* 
(5.29) 
     
Controls for:     
Age quartic Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Permanent inc.  Yes Yes Yes 
Health   Yes Yes 
Preferences    Yes 
Note: Table shows the model instrumental variables estimate of the impact of Medigap coverage on income from 
pension or annuities. The mean of the dependent variable is 6.34, and it standard deviation is 5.85. The excluded 
instrument is the log of Medigap price; its coefficient is reported in Panel B, and the reduced form coefficient on log 
price is reported in panel AAdditional controls are included as indicated. See the text for a definition of the sample. 
The sample consists of 3,335 observations of 1,406 individuals. Demographic controls are dummies for female, 
black, married, educational attainment (high school, some college, college or more), and number of children (one, 
two, or three plus). The permanent income control is a cubic in the log of permanent income (average income before 
retirement), plus an interaction between log permanent income and age. The health controls add a set of dummy 
variables for several chronic conditions, plus indicators for self-reported health status. The preference controls are 
controls for subjective mortality expectations and subjective risk tolerance. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard 
errors, clustered on individuals, are in parentheses. Asterisks indicate statistical significance, with *: p<0.1, ** 
p<0.05, and *** p<0.01. 
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Table 6: Impact of Medigap coverage on Social Security Income 
Dependent Var.:  
Social Security income 
 ($ thousands) 
(1) 
Basic 
(2)  
Permanent income  
(3) 
Health  
(4) 
Preferences 
Panel A: Reduced Form 
Coefficient on 
log(Medigap price) 
-1.92*** 
(0.73) 
-1.73** 
(0.68) 
-1.70** 
(0.68) 
-1.68** 
(0.68) 
Panel B: IV Results 
Coefficient on 
Medigap 
4.01*** 
(1.54) 
3.72** 
(1.51) 
3.61** 
(1.47) 
3.59** 
(1.48) 
     
Controls for:     
Age quartic Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Permanent inc.  Yes Yes Yes 
Health   Yes Yes 
Preferences    Yes 
Note: Table shows the instrumental variables estimate of the impact of Medigap coverage on the indicated 
outcomes. The mean of the dependent variable is 11.3, and its standard deviation is 5.40. The excluded instrument is 
the log of Medigap price; its coefficient is reported in Panel B, and the reduced form coefficient on log price is 
reported in panel A. Additional controls are included as indicated. See the text for a definition of the sample. The 
sample consists of 3,335 observations of 1406 individuals. Demographic controls are dummies for female, black, 
married, educational attainment (high school, some college, college or more), and number of children (one, two, or 
three plus). The permanent income control is a cubic in the log of permanent income (average income before 
retirement), plus an interaction between log permanent income and age. The health controls add a set of dummy 
variables for several chronic conditions, plus indicators for self-reported health status. The preference controls are 
controls for subjective mortality expectations and subjective risk tolerance. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard 
errors, clustered on individuals, are in parentheses. Asterisks indicate statistical significance, with *: p<0.1, ** 
p<0.05, and *** p<0.01. 
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Table 7: Robustness to Pre-determined endogenous variables 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Controls: Basic controls  All controls 
Outcome: Has private 
pension income 
(%) 
Private pension 
income 
(thousands $) 
Social Security 
Income 
(thousands $) 
 Has private 
pension income 
(%) 
Private pension 
income  
(thousands $) 
Social Security 
Income 
 (thousands $) 
Panel A: Reduced Form 
Original     
Controls 
-0.20*** 
(0.07) 
-5.22** 
(2.63) 
-1.92*** 
(0.73) 
 -0.17** 
(0.07) 
-4.68* 
(2.39) 
-1.68** 
(0.68) 
Add OOP 
expenditures 
-0.20*** 
(0.08) 
-5.94** 
(2.75) 
-1.69** 
(0.74) 
 -0.17** 
(0.07) 
-4.94** 
(2.42) 
-1.55** 
(0.69) 
Add ln(savings) -0.20*** 
(0.07) 
-5.58** 
(2.74) 
-1.91*** 
(0.72) 
 -0.17** 
(0.07) 
-4.73** 
(2.39) 
-1.67** 
(0.68) 
Both both 0.20*** 
(0.07) 
-5.94** 
(2.75) 
-1.69** 
(0.73) 
 -0.17** 
(0.07) 
-4.97** 
(2.41) 
-1.55** 
(0.69) 
Panel B: Instrumental Variables 
Original     
Controls 
0.41*** 
(0.17) 
11.2* 
(5.83) 
4.01*** 
(1.54) 
 0.37** 
(0.16) 
9.48* 
(5.19) 
3.59** 
(1.48) 
Add OOP 
expenditures 
0.41*** 
(0.17) 
12.48** 
(5.95) 
3.56** 
(1.56) 
 0.36** 
(0.17) 
10.6** 
(5.38) 
3.31** 
(1.51) 
Add ln(savings) 0.41*** 
(0.17) 
11.67** 
(5.87) 
3.99*** 
(1.52) 
 0.35** 
(0.16) 
10.2* 
(5.44) 
3.81** 
(1.48) 
Both both 0.41*** 
(0.17) 
12.47** 
(5.95) 
3.56** 
(1.54) 
 0.35** 
(0.17) 
10.8* 
(5.53) 
3.52** 
(1.50) 
Controls For:        
Age quartic Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Demographics Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Permanent inc.     Yes Yes Yes 
Health     Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Table shows the instrumental variables estimate of the impact of Medigap coverage on the indicated outcome. The excluded instrument is the log of 
Medigap price; its coefficient is reported in Panel B, and the reduced form coefficient on log price is reported in panel A. Additional controls are included as 
indicated. See the text for a definition of the sample. Demographic controls are dummies for female, black, married, educational attainment (high school, some 
college, college or more), and number of children (one, two, or three plus). The permanent income control is a cubic in the log of permanent income (average 
income before retirement), plus an interaction between log permanent income and age. The health controls add a set of dummy variables for several chronic 
conditions, plus indicators for self-reported health status. The preference controls are controls for subjective mortality expectations and subjective risk tolerance. 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered on individuals, are in parentheses. Asterisks indicate statistical significance, with *: p<0.1, ** p<0.05, and 
*** p<0.01. 
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 Figure 1: First-stage relationship between Medigap coverage and its price, in logs, net of basic 
controls 
 
Notes: This figure plots the local polynomial (degree 1) fit between log Medigap price and Medigap coverage, net of 
controls for age, year, and demographics. The dashed lines show the 95% confidence interval. The figure is 
constructed in three steps. First, I regress Medigap coverage and log Medigap price (separately) on controls for age, 
year, and demographics. Second, I form the residuals from this regression. Third, I estimate a local linear regression 
of residual Medigap on residual log price. I plot the fitted values from this regression.   
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Figure 2: Reduced-form relationship between Pr(pension/annuity income) and log(Medigap 
price), net of basic controls 
 
Notes: This figure plots the local polynomial (degree 1) fit between log Medigap price and an indicator for having 
private pension or annuity income, net of controls for age, year, and demographics. The dashed lines show the 95% 
confidence interval. The figure is constructed in three steps. First, I regress the indicator and log Medigap price 
(separately) on controls for age, year, and demographics. Second, I form the residuals from this regression. Third, I 
estimate a local linear regression of the residual indicator on residual log price. I plot the fitted values from this 
regression.   
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Figure 3: Reduced-form relationship between pension/annuity income and log(Medigap price), 
net of basic controls 
 
Notes: This figure plots the local polynomial (degree 1) fit between log Medigap price and private pension/annuity 
income, net of controls for age, year, and demographics. The dashed lines show the 95% confidence interval. The 
figure is constructed in three steps. First, I regress private pension/annuity income and log Medigap price 
(separately) on controls for age, year, and demographics. Second, I form the residuals from this regression. Third, I 
estimate a local linear regression of residual private pension/annuity income on residual log price. I plot the fitted 
values from this regression.   
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Figure 4: Reduced-form relationship between Social Security income and log(Medigap price), 
net of basic controls 
 
Notes: This figure plots the local polynomial (degree 1) fit between log Medigap price and Social Security income, 
net of controls for age, year, and demographics. The dashed lines show the 95% confidence interval. The figure is 
constructed in three steps. First, I regress Social Security income and log Medigap price (separately) on controls for 
age, year, and demographics. Second, I form the residuals from this regression. Third, I estimate a local linear 
regression of residual Social Security Income on residual log price. I plot the fitted values from this regression.  
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